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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Concurs in appellants1 statement. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER CobRT 
Concurs in appellants1 statement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the ruling of the lower 
court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent concurs in appellants1 statement and adds that 
he simply denies being father of the child. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANTS1 SOCIAL ARGUMENT IS 
NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THIS CASE. 
The main thrust of appellants1 brief is not that the sta-
tutes are not clear. Although there is some overlap and omission 
in the statutes, the wording is not nebulous as regards the time 
limits for commencement of a paternity or support action and 
appellants have exceeded these. The 1975 amendment to §78-12-22 
provides: 
"WITHIN EIGHT YEARS. - within eight years: . . . an action 
to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure 
to provide support or maintenance for dependent children." 
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The law will be argued in following points. 
Appellants1 real argument is a powerful social and moral 
argument that a child should not be bastardized and deprived of 
his father, and accordingly, the court should do anything it cam 
to avoid application of the statute of limitations. 
Respondent's counsel, having adopted children of his own, 
finds this argument goes strongly to his own conscience. 
There are, however, contra arguments that must be consi-
dered. 
Appellants' argument lends itself to the idea that the 
child's social wrongs can be redressed by having respondent named 
as his father. 
Unfortunately, this is not entirely so. 
We should distinguish benefits to the child himself from 
benefits to society. 
Addressing ourselves first to the benefits to the child, 
what is a father? A family name is important but adopted childrer 
often do nicely although they know the man who raises them is not 
their real father, and that their real father, for whatever his 
reasons, didn't stand up when it was to be counted. 
It might be considered that a real father is a relationship 
The man who gives time, his love, himself, to the child, might 
be a real father. That man who is willing to act as father is fax 
more important to the child than is the man who, by accident of 
blood, is the true father. 
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The point is that a functioning relationship, rather than 
a legal position, is the essence of a father - child relationship. 
It would be desirable if the father of an illegitimate 
child had the power to provide this relationship to the child. 
He can't except at the grace of the mother. Under Utah law, she 
is sole custodial parent. In Re State in the Interest of Baby 
Girl M, 25 U2d 101, 476 P2d 1013. 
In fairness, it should be noted that in future cases, it 
is possible that a father might be able to claim a visiting privi-
lege under the language of the 19 75 amendment to the adoption 
code, §78-30-4 (3) , UCA, which provides!: 
11
 (a) A person who is the father or claims to be the 
father of an illegitimate child may claim rights per-
taining to his paternity of the child by registering 
with the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the Division 
of Health, Utah Department of Social Services, a notice 
of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and 
of his willingness and intent to support the child to 
the best of his ability." 
No limitation is provided. Accordingly, should the father 
of an out-of-wedlock child wish to exercise parental rights, he 
would have to comply with §78-12-25 (2), UCA (1953): 
"WITHIN FOUR YEARS. within four years: (2) an action 
for relief not otherwise provided for by law." 
Applying the concept of visiting, the father - child re-
lationship, to this case, we can concede from the pleadings that 
here we have no functioning relationship, no acknowledgment of 
paternity, no visits and payment of money, because such would 
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have been plead in response to respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, to toll the statute or estop respondent from raising it 
We might also assume that the mother, as she might have 
been able to do something to get father and child together if she 
wished, does not favor such a relationship in the future. 
In regard to the question of "Who am I?", that a child 
asks, the most to be gained here is an answer along the lines of 
"My mother says fXf is my father, the jury says 'X' is my father, 
but fXf says he isn't." Is this clearly of benefit to the child? 
In sum, the human benefit to this child is speculative. 
There is an advantage to the child to have a father to supp 
it. This is not disputed. Here, though, if the mother intended 
to establish an existence free of welfare, and its standard of 
living, she could have done so long ago. Eight years on welfare 
indicates a chronic condition. 
She could have filed this action years back to get the in-
come from respondent, if he were proved liable, to help free her 
from welfare. She chose not to do so. 
The only tangible advantage we really have is reimbursement 
of the State and its taxpayers. 
This also is not disputed as being a proper and important 
goal, in theory. 
In practice, though, in this case, where was the State's 
enforcement arm over the last eight years? If the mother ever 
named respondent as father, the action could have been brought 
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during her pregnancy (§78-45a-6, UCA 1965), or in any of the 
years since. 
The results of the State's failure to act are: (1) a large 
lump obligation for respondent to meet if he is found to be the 
father; (2) loss of his factual ability through attrition of time 
to fairly present his defenses; (3) forfeiture without chance of 
recovery by the State of its first four years of payment to the 
mother, including the substantial medical bills that attend a 
birth (§78-45a-3, 1965); (4) hazarding by the State of the whole 
sum if the father should move to places unknown or die and time 
for claims run out during the period. 
Statutes of limitations are cruel. It is their nature. 
They arbitrarily cut off existing rights that are often legitimate 
and important. The statutes are justified by the social need to 
have controversy come to an end. This is well stated at 51 AmJur 
2d, Limitation of Actions, §17, page 602, 
"The primary purpose of a statute of limitations is to 
compel the exercise of a right of action within a reason-
able time so that the opposing party has a fair oppor-
tunity to defend. 
"Statutes of limitation are founded upon the general ex-
perience of mankind that claims which are valid are not 
usually allowed to remain neglected if the right to sue 
thereon exists. Statutes of limitation are designed to 
prevent undue delay in bringing suit on claims and suppress 
fraudulent and stale claims from being asserted, to the 
surprise of the parties or their representatives, when 
all the proper vouchers and evidence are lost, or the 
facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or the 
defective memory or death or removal of witnesses." 
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Appellants argue in their brief that they, rather than re-
spondent, are damaged by delay in the presentation of evidence 
at trial. This could be a practical point as a jury might tend 
against an old claim. 
The real burden of delay though has to be on the defending 
party. 
The mother can establish a prima facie case simply by 
testifying that respondent was the only man with whom she had 
sexual relations during her period of conception. Such testimony 
might be rebutted by defendant to some degree. This kind of 
evidence results in coin tosses by the trier of facts as to which 
party has the knack of being more convincing. 
Time is the enemy of the defense because a proper defense 
is primarily detective work - finding data and witnesses to prove 
the claim is not proper. This task can become impossible as time 
runs, witnesses die or move, and facts become unavailable. AppLie 
here, how does respondent now prove what he was doing on a certain 
day in 1967 (when conception occurred) or how does he now find 
witnesses who were then boyfriends of the mother? 
In setting the statute of limitations at eight years, the 
Legislature set a time limit years greater than in most cases. 
Should this limitation period be too short, it is for the Legis-
lature, as representative of the people, to consider all social, 
economic and legal issues, and determine what revisions should be 
made. 
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This point was recently considered by our appellate court 
in Shelmidine v. Jones, et al., case number 14152, filed May 20, 
19 76, the court saying: 
"Also, it should be borne in mind that there is a defi-
nite distinction between a change in interpretation or 
application of a statute, which sometimes quite justi-
fiably occurs, and attempting by judicial fiat to 
affect a substantial change in law as clearly expressed 
in statute or the constitution. When such a substantial 
change is necessary or desirable, our constitution has 
set up procedures for the change by the legislature, 
or of the constitution, by the amendment process." 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFS1 CASE IS BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The "Bastardy Act", §77-60-1 et seq., UCA 1953, should be 
mentioned although it is not controlling. It provides, at §77-
60-15, 
"No prosecution under this chapter shall be brought 
after four years from the birth of such child; pro-
vided, that the time the person accused shall be 
absent from the state shall not be computed." 
As this period is limited by its terms to Bastardy Act 
actions, it does not seem pertinent to this case, even though in 
State v. Judd, 27 U2d 79, 493 P2d 604, it was held that the 
Bastardy Act survives as a companion alternative to proceedings 
under the Uniform Act on Paternity, 78-45a, UCA, the main differ-
ence between the two Acts stated as being that under the Bastardy 
Act, the mother alone can bring the action, while under the 
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Uniform Act on Paternity/ it can be brought by the mother or by 
the public authority chargeable with support of the child. 
Let us look to the other statutes. 
The Uniform Act on Paternity, 78-45a, UCA, was enacted in 
1965. 
The Paternity Act has no statute of limitations in it, no 
provision stating how many years after birth of a child an action 
may be commenced. Instead, it has a provision stating that: 
"78-45a-3. LIMITATION ON RECOVERY FROM THE FATHER. 
The father's liabilities for past education and neces-
sary support are limited to a period of four years 
next preceding the commencement of an action." 
This section has not been interpreted by Utah cases. By 
its language, its purpose seems clear. It controls the accumu-
lation of arrearage the father has to pay by limiting the recovery 
period. The section fails entirely to provide for when an action 
may be commenced. 
This omission was rectified by the Utah Legislature in 
19 75 when it added a new paragraph to the general eight year statu-
of limitations, which reads: 
"78-12-22. WITHIN EIGHT YEARS. within eight years. 
"An Action to enforce any liability due or to become 
due for failure to provide support or maintenance for 
dependent children." (emphasis added) 
This enactment covers any kind of case brought to enforce 
support. 
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It actually benefits the State and mother by giving them 
four more years than they had before in which to bring the action. 
Before the amendment to §78-12-22, the Bastardy Act with 
its four year provision might have been controlling, in view of 
the language in State v. Judd, supra, that the two acts were to 
be reasonably correlated. If not, the mother's time of recovery 
was limited because, the Paternity Act being silent, the action 
would be governed by §78-12-26(4), UCA, which provides a three 
year limitation for "An action for a liability created by the 
statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture 
under the laws of this state, except where in special cases a 
different limitation is prescribed by tfhe statutes of this state.1 
(Emphasis added) 
The amendment to 78-12-22 also reconciled the conflict 
of the limitation periods just cited with the four year arrearage 
stopper established in the Paternity Act. 
It will be noted that the word "paternity" does not appear 
in §78-12-22. The word is not needed and was undoubtedly omitted 
by purpose so as not to interfere with determinations of heirship 
or other cases were a proper issue might arise involving the 
establishment of paternity. 
A right without a remedy is no right at all, as the prag-
matics of our legal history have it. §78-12-22 effectively stopp 
the remedy of recovery of support, it properly left open determin 
tion of paternity for those special cases where it is necessary. 
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POINT III, 
THE FACT THAT A MINOR IS INVOLVED IN 
THIS LITIGATION DOES NOT TOLL THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
"78-12-36. EFFECTIVE DISABILITY. if a person entitled 
to bring an action, other than for recovery of real 
property, is at the time the cause accrued, either: 
"(1) under the age of majority;. . . 
"The time of such disability is not a part of the time 
limited for commencement of the action." 
Under our law, a minor is not entitled to bring an action 
for his own support. 
In this case, the child is not even a party to the action. 
"Sally M. Martinez and the State of Utah, by and through 
Utah State Department of Social Services," 
are plaintiffs and appellants. 
As stated in the recent case, Stanton v. Stanton, Case numb* 
14268, Utah, filed June 23, 1976f in both the main and concurring 
opinion, it was held that a child does not have standing before 
the court in matters concerning recovery of his own support. 
Right to the action is held by the person who has the responsi-
bility for the support, be it mother, guardian or state agency. 
As a second reason for determining that the statute of 
limitations is not tolled by minority of the child, it must be 
remembered that recovery of support from the father of an illegiti-
mate child is entirely governed by statute and did not exist at 
common law. In re State of Utah in the Interest of Baby Girl M, 
25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P2d 1013. 
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A comparable line of cases are those in which injured 
children are barred in their claims against cities because not 
timely filed even though the children remained minor at the time 
of filing. Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P2d 799 (Utah 1975); 
Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 U2d 27, 492 P2d 1335; and Hurley v. 
Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213. 
In those cases, the difficulty of a municipality in assem-
bling its evidence when a stale claim is presented was a factor, 
as was the factor that the parents had active control of their 
children and could have acted promptly for their benefit if they 
had chosen to. 
The major factor and the one that matches the concepts in 
the case at bar was that a claim against a city is entirely a 
creation of statute, being formerly barred by sovereign immunity, 
except as since specifically allowed by statute. 
Gallegos, supra, cited Hurley, supra, 
". . .as the right to any damages at all is purely 
statutory, it can only be availed of when there has 
been a reasonable effort to comply with the conditions 
upon which the right is conferred." 
That rationale precisely parallels the instant case. Firs 
the right to support was conferred by the Bastardy Act with its 
four year period of limitations. This right was broadened by 
the Paternity Act which omitted limitations. This omission was 
cured by the Legislature in its amendment of §78-12-22 setting 
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the eight year limit which now controls. Thus, both the right, 
and the limitation of the right are exclusively statutory crea-
tions, and so prevent tolling of the statute due to minority of 
the child. 
CONCLUSION 
It is grievous that the child in this case does not have 
a known father, but it is too late now to do much to benefit him 
personally. More grievous, because of its duty to protect the 
taxpayer and those who receive family assistance, is the failure 
of the State of Utah to file an action of this type promptly. 
Summary judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED July 29, 19 76. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL KING 
-12-
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify I delivered two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent to Vernon B. Romney, Utah Attorney General, 
and Stephen G. Schwendiman, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys 
for the Appellants, at 2 36 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, by leaving true and correct copies at their offices 
on July , 1976. 
-13-
